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0) 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
West Valley City, 
Appellant/Respondent, 
Vs. 
Richard Norris, 
Appellee/Petitioner. 
Case No. 960151CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The decision sought to be reviewed is the Order of Dismissal entered March 26, 1997, the denial for 
the Petition for Rehearing entered May 13, 1997, by the Utah Court of Appeals, and the ruling of the Trial 
Court entered February 5, 1996. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals and the Trial Court error, when they failed to inquire in the 
complaints that Petitioner raised about his court re-appointed counsel? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals error, when they allowed the Trial Court to re-appoint the 
same counsel, rather than substitute counsel as previously ordered? 
3. Should an indigent Petitioner be forced to proceed with counsel when a complete breakdown 
in communication and irreconcilable differences had occurred a second time? 
4. Is the Utah Communication Fraud Statute ambiguous therefore Unconstitutional? 
5. Did the Utah Court of Appeals error when they allowed the Appellant to dismiss its appeal in 
order to bring charges that are more serious to gain an unfair trial advantage over the Appellee? 
( i ) 
OPINIONS OF THE COURT 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in West Valley City vs. Richard Norris and docket sheet of 
the Circuit Court is contained in the Addendum. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal by virtue of the Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 78-2-2 (3) (a), 78-2-2(5), and 78-2a-4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Petitioner, Richard Norris, was charged by information with four counts (Class A Misdemeanors) 
)f Communications Fraud, violating the Utah Code 76-10-1801 UCA on December 20, 1994. This 
nformation was later found defective by the Trial Court. The prosecution then attempted to amend the 
>riginal information after the Statute of Limitations had expired. The prosecution also failed to provide the 
Petitioner with a Bill of Particulars and failed to give the Petitioner notice of the charges he may have to 
Iefend. The Trial Court without addressing these issues, entered an order to dismiss this case based upon lack 
)f jurisdiction. 
The prosecution then filed an appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. The Trial Court found Petitioner 
ndigent and appointed counsel. The Petitioner's counsel failed to file a brief before oral argument, failed to 
ile a cross appeal, and refused to represent the Petitioner. The Petitioner notified the Utah Court of Appeals 
hat there was a problem with his appointed counsel. The court agreed and remanded this case back to the 
Trial Court. The Trial Court then re-appointed the same counsel to represent the Petitioner. The Petitioner 
incerely tried to reconcile his differences with his counsel without success; the same problems Petitioner had 
>efore re-occurred and compounded. The Petitioner attempted to notify both the Trial Court and the Utah 
I!ourt of Appeals, both courts refused to hear the Petitioner complaints and failed to make any kind of inquiry. 
(2) 
The Petitioner was then charged with ten counts of Communication Fraud while this case was pending appeal, 
(which was also later dismissed). The Appellant then filed a notice to dismiss its appeal, so that the County 
Prosecutors could proceed with felony charges. The Utah Court of Appeals entered an order March 26, 1997 
to allow the Prosecution to dismiss its appeal over the Appellee's objection. The Appellee filed a Petition for 
Rehearing on April 7, 1997, which was denied. The Appellee then Petitioned for an Extraordinary Writ which 
was granted in part by the Utah Supreme Court on June 23, 1997. An Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time 
was filed on June 9, 1997 and granted the Petitioner until July 12, 1997, to file a Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Detective Steven Humphreys, of the West Valley City Police Department, was named as a 
Defendant in a civil lawsuit, Case No. 940903999CV, that was filed in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, as a result of defamatory statements Detective Steven Humphreys made to 
various news media organizations against the Petitioner and his business. Detective Steven Humphreys was 
served a civil summons and complaint on or about December 14, 1994. In retaliation, Detective Steven 
Humphreys, Detective Brook Plotnick of the West Valley Police Department and Mr. Keith Stoney, the lead 
prosecutor for West Valley City, willfully conspired to maliciously charge the Petitioner with four counts of 
Communications Fraud in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), UCA 1953, as amended, on 
December 20, 1994. This case was titled: "West Valley City vs. Richard Norris, Case No. 941004929", 
(hereinafter, referred to as the original information), in the court then known as the Third Circuit Court, State 
of Utah, Salt Lake County, West Valley Department. 
2. The original information did not state the alleged victims' names, the dollar amounts 
allegedly to have been taken, the scheme to defraud, omissions, the misrepresentations, or false pretenses, etc. 
Because of the vagueness of the original information, the Petitioner could not prepare his defense; therefore, a 
Bill of Particulars was demanded, which the prosecution failed to provide the Petitioner. 
3. On or about October 2, 1995, the prosecution attempted to amend the original information 
(3) 
md state the victims' names and changed the date of the alleged crime from 1994 to 1993, which was 
tttempted to be amended after the two-year statue of limitations had ran. This amended information then 
itated: 
"That Richard Norris in March, April, or May 1993, devised a scheme to defraud or 
obtain money, property, or anything of value totaling more than $300.00 by false pretenses, 
misrepresentations, promises or omissions and communicated directly and indirectly to the 
(victims) by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, "(emphasis 
added) 
This amended information also did not state with particularity or identify what the alleged scheme to 
lefraud was, the alleged false pretenses, misrepresentations, or omissions or how the Petitioner allegedly 
executed or concealed the scheme. 
4. The Petitioner then brought a Motion to Quash the Amended Information and Strike 
nformation on File, which was heard, by the Honorable Judge Watson on or about October 26, 1995. During 
his hearing, the Prosecution openly admitted on the record, "They could not proceed with the original 
nformation", which Judge Watson confirmed and subsequently found that the original information was 
lefective. The Honorable Judge Watson also realized the real nature of this case was a civil dispute and the 
irosecution was acting in bad faith in filing the original information (without formally addressing the issue of 
whether the Prosecution could amend the information that was so vague that the information was actually a 
lew filing after the statute of limitations had run). Judge Watson then ordered the original information 
lismissed. Based in part his court lacked jurisdiction and based also in part, because the amended information 
harged four victims at $300.00 each. Judge Watson's interpretation of the Utah Communications Fraud 
Itatute was the offense or offenses must be totaled together to determine the level of the offense. This 
> 1,200.00 amount charged by the Prosecution exceeded the Circuit Courts jurisdictional limit of $1,000.00; 
herefore, Judge Watson entered an order to dismiss this original information on February 6, 1996. 
5. On or about March 5, 1996, the Respondent then filed an appeal based upon the theory, the 
>rosecution had the discretion to charge a lesser level of offense than what was allegedly committed and that 
he Circuit Court did have jurisdiction. The Trial Court subsequently appointed Mr. C. Danny Fraizer as 
ounsel to represent the Appellee/Petitioner in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
(4) 
6. The Petitioner then tried to schedule an appointment to meet with Mr. Fraizer. The 
Appellee/Petitioner left several messages each week for over eight weeks with Mr. Fraizer, and it was not 
until the Petitioner phoned and complained to Judge Watson's clerk, and the clerk at the Utah Court of 
Appeals did Mr. Fraizer schedule an appointment. Finally, after meeting with Mr. Frazier the 
Appellee/Petitioner directed Mr. Fraizer to file a cross appeal based upon several important issues. 
First Issue: 
It seems clear to the Petitioner that the Communication Fraud Statute contradicts itself and is 
unconstitutional. The Petitioner does not know if the charges should be four separate charges, at $300.00 each 
(Class A Misdemeanors), or if the total amount of the scheme is to be aggregated ($1200.00) and charged as 
one Felony (Third Degree), or if a person ran an ad in a newspaper and the ad was false and the newspaper 
had a circulation of 200,000 readers, do we have 200,000 individual misdemeanor violations, or one high 
degree felony. Or if the same ad ran seven days, do we have seven counts or one. 
Second Issue: 
Whether the Prosecution would be barred from bringing these charges based upon the theory 
of crossover collateral estoppel. The Petitioner had filed a small claims action against each of the alleged 
victims named in the amended information. Each victim claimed Fraud and Misrepresentation in the Small 
Claims Trial. A judgement was granted in favor of the Petitioner except for one witness - Mike Mabry. The 
Petitioner lost this case. It was later found out in the discovery of the Civil Defamation Case that the Small 
Claims Judge, Mr. Michael Crippen, and Small Claims Defense attorney Mr. Russell Cline (who was 
representing Mr. Mabry), were actually law Partners with the same law firm at the time of the Small Claims 
Trial, which Mr. Crippen and Mr. Cline failed to disclose, and neither one of them recused themselves before 
the trial. If the Petitioner were able to win his cases in Small Claims Court, how would the Prosecution, in a 
Criminal Case with a much higher standard of proof be able to now prevail and be allowed to re-litigate the 
same issues as heard in Small Claims Court? 
Third Issue: 
Because of the vagueness of the original information, the Petitioner was not put on notice of 
the charges and any amendment would have to be considered an additional and different charge, which is not 
(5) 
llowed after the Statute of Limitations has expired. 
Fourth Issue: 
Should Judge Watson be allowed to examine material, that may never be admitted into 
vidence at the trial to determine whether or not the circuit court had jurisdiction or would the original 
nformation have to stand or fall based upon the language contained in the original information. 
7. Before the Respondent filed these charges on December 20, 1994, the West Valley Police 
)epartment screened this case with the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Salt Lake County District 
attorney's Office. Both branches of Government determined this case was civil in nature, not criminal, and 
herefore, refused to prosecute the Petitioner. 
8. After the Respondent finally realized they had made several fatal mistakes in drafting their 
original information, denying the Petitioner a Bill of Particulars, then attempting to amend a void original 
nformation after the statue of limitations had run, Detective Polnick of the West Valley Police Department 
hen pressured, and was somehow able to convince, Mr. Ernie Jones of the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office to refile these same charges as felonies, which the statue of limitations had not run. 
9. The Petitioner was then charged with ten felony counts of Communications Fraud in 
Violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), UCA 1953, October 1, 1996, under Case No. 961020866 
>f The Third District Court, Salt Lake Department Division II in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This 
lew information still did not state the victims' names, the nature of the scheme, the alleged misrepresentation 
>r omission, etc. The Honorable Judge Palmer subsequently dismissed all ten counts on or about December 
0, 1996 based in part, upon the original information, West Valley City vs. Richard Norris; Case No. 
>60151CA was pending a final decision in the Utah Court of Appeals. Judge Palmer further warned the 
prosecution they could not proceed with the prosecution of the Defendant/Petitioner until the appeal (Case 
sfo. 960151 CA) came to a conclusion. 
10. On or about December 10, 1996, the Appellant/Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss its 
ippeal, Case No. 960151 CA, for the sole purpose of proceeding with felony charges. 
11. On or about November 22, 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals acknowledged that there was a 
:omplete breakdown in communications and irreconcilable differences between the Appellee, Richard Norris, 
(6) 
and his court appointed attorney, Mr. Frazier, based in part because, his counsel failed to file a brief, and then 
filed a notice to withdraw a few days before oral argument was scheduled without prior court permission. In a 
partially tape-recorded telephone conversation Mr. Fraizer stated: "He had only been paid $150 and even if 
the court sanctioned him, he would not represent the Appellee any further." Mr. Fraizer then directed the 
Appellee to pick up his file and defend himself, Pro se. 
The Utah Court of Appeals then ordered: 
"This matter is remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of appointing 
substitute counsel for the Appellee, Richard Norris, at which time the withdrawal of Mr. C. 
Danny Frazier is granted." 
12. On or about January 10, 1997, The trial court held a special hearing to appoint substitute 
counsel. Mr. Frazier failed to attend this special hearing and subsequently the trial court continued the hearing 
to January 30, 1997. 
13. On or about January 30, 1997 the trial court held a second special hearing to appoint 
substitute counsel. Mr. Frazier again failed to appear and again Petitioner was not represented by counsel at 
this hearing. Before the hearing began on January 30, 1997, Mr. Bruce Larsen, who is another public defender 
for West Valley City, approached and misled the Petitioner. He told the Petitioner he "had tried to find another 
attorney to represent the Petitioner but he was unsuccessful", and he further stated I would "just have to 
accept Mr. Frazier as your attorney. You have no other choice." Petitioner also does recall Judge Watson 
asking the Petitioner if he "would accept the reappointment of Mr. Frazier." Petitioner replied: "I would if 
Mr. Frazier would roll up his sleeves and go to work on my case." 
14. After the re-appointment of Mr. Fraizer, the Petitioner sincerely tried to reconcile, however 
on or about February 10, 1997, Petitioner encountered another unfortunate complete breakdown of 
communication and irreconcilable differences between Petitioner and his re-appointed council Mr. Frazier 
based in part because Mr. Frazier still refused to file a cross appeal, which the Petitioner had directed at the 
beginning of the appeal. 
15. On or about February 18, 1997, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order that Appellee's 
response to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss be filed no later than March 3, 1997. 
16. On or about February 19, 1997, the Petitioner filed a Motion Pro se to Appoint Substitute 
(7) 
"ounsel with the Trial Court. No hearing was held and subsequently Petitioner's motion was denied. 
17. On or about February 26, 1997, the Petitioner filed a Motion Pro se to Stay the Utah Court of 
appeals order that was entered February 18, 1997, and to appoint new counsel because of a second 
reakdown in communication and irreconcilable differences that had occurred on February 10, 1997, between 
Petitioner and his attorney, Mr. Frazier. No hearing was held, and subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals 
lso denied this motion on March 26, 1997. 
18. Appellee's response to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was due on March 3, 1997. Appellee 
iter learned that the response to the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was not filed by Mr. Frazier with the Utah 
"ourt of Appeals until March 5, 1997. 
19. On or about March 26, 1997, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order that stated, in part: 
''The defendant's Motion to Stay is denied and this appeal is dismissed." 
20. On or about April 1, 1997, the Petitioner then started to conduct legal research and began 
Irafting a Motion for appointment of counsel, to assist the Petitioner to petition the Utah Court of Appeals for 
rehearing under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Petitioner was also in the process of 
rafting a Petition for Rehearing, pro se, just in case the Utah Court of Appeals should deny Appellee's 
notion for appointment of counsel and extension of time. 
21. On April 2, 1997, the Petitioner was arrested (Case No. 971005698FS, Third District Court, 
Itate of Utah, Salt lake Department, Division II) which is now the third arrest on these same charges, and 
cooked into the Salt Lake County Jail. Bail was set at $75,000.00. In addition a search warrant was 
wrongfully served upon Petitioner, and all computers, word processing software, files, important legal notes, 
tc , that were relevant to this case, and Appellee's rough draft for a Petition for rehearing, was illegally 
eized and taken. 
22. On or about April 7, 1997, while Petitioner was incarcerated, Petitioner was able to have a 
amily member (Danny Solt) file a faxed copy of a partially complete Petition for Rehearing, in addition Mr. 
)ave Maddox, Esquire, spoke with an attorney from the Utah Attorney General's Office. They assured Mr. 
vladdox their office would also file a Petition for Rehearing with the Utah Court of Appeals that was taken on 
^pril 2, 1997, before the required filing period on behalf of the Petitioner. Which the Utah Attorney General's 
(8) 
Office later confirmed on April 9, 1997, they had delivered on April 7, 1997. 
23. On or about April 11, 1997, the Petitioner appeared before the Honorable L.S. Dever, (Case 
No.971005698FS, Third District Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake Department, Division II) on a motion to 
dismiss the charges that were filed April 2, 1997, and subsequently these charges were dismissed and 
Petitioner was released from Jail. 
24. The Petitioner filed a Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari on June 9, 1997 with the Utah Supreme Court and this Court entered an order allowing Petitioner 
until July 12, 1997 to file a Petition for Certiorari. 
(9) 
ARGUMENT ON ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ARGUMENT I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, WHEN THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE AN 
INQUIRY INTO APPELLEE'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS COUNSEL. 
The Petitioner/Appellee filed a Motion to Re-appoint Substitute Counsel on February 19, 1997, with 
le Trial Court and also attempted to notify the Utah Court of Appeals on February 26, 1997, that the 
etitioner/Appellee had encountered another breakdown in communication of irreconcilable differences with 
4r. Fraizer on February 10, 1997. These Motions were brought in good faith and not for delay. 
The Utah Court of Appeals said in State v. Pursifell 746 P2d 270: 
"When dissatisfaction is expressed, the court must make some reasonable, 
non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's complaints 
and to apprise itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the 
defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated 
to the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an 
extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated for 
substitution. Even when the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests 
are disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and 
to delay the trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient." United States vs. 
Welty, 674 F2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1982) 
The Utah Court of Appeals failed to make any kind of inquiry, effort or even perfunctory questioning 
nto Appellee/Petitioner's dissatisfaction with his counsel and seems to have completely contradicted its 
irevious decision in State v. Pursifell. 
Judge Watson ruled that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant Appellee's motion to re-
ppoint substitute counsel (which is probably correct, but how is a lay Defendant/Appellee to know), 
lowever, Judge Watson was timely notified that there was a breakdown in communication and irreconcilable 
Iifference between the Petitioner and his counsel. Even if Judge Watson did not have jurisdiction to hear 
Appellee/Petitioners motion to re-appoint substitute counsel, he could have and should have notified, or 
eferred this matter to, a court that did have jurisdiction to hear this motion to re-appoint substitute counsel. 
(10) 
The court said in United States vs. Wadsworth 830 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1987): 
"An indigent defendant's right to counsel under the sixth amendment is not 
contingent upon his request for appointed counsel See Carnally, 369 U.S. at 
513, 82 S.C. at 889; United States v. Karr, 742 F2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 
1984)." 
ARGUMENT II 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, WHEN THEY ALLOWED THE TRIAL 
COURT TO RE-APPOINT THE SAME COUNSEL, RATHER THAN SUBSTITUTE 
COUNSEL, AS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED. 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered an order on November 22, 1996 that stated in part: 
"This matter is remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of 
appointing substitute counsel for Appellee, Richard Norris^ at 
which time this withdrawal of counsel Mr. C. Danny Frazier is 
granted." (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court held a special hearing on January 10, 1997 to re-appoint substitute counsel for the 
Appellee/Petitioner. Mr. Frazier failed to appear. The trial court continued the hearing to January 30, 1997. 
Mr. Frazier again failed to appear and again Appellee/Petitioner was not represented by counsel. The trial 
court on January 30, 1997, then re-appointed the same counsel, (Mr. Frazier). It was Petitioner's 
understanding as per the Utah Court of Appeals order of November 22, 1996, that the trial court was to 
appoint substitute counsel, not re-appoint the same counsel. 
The Court stated in U.S. vs. Wadsworth 830F 2nd 1500 (9th Cir. 1987) at 1510, in reference to a 
motion to appoint new counsel: 
"We are also convinced that the proceeding conducted by the court on the 
defendant's motions resulted in the denial to the Defendant of his right to due 
process and the right to counsel at that hearing. An accused is entitled to 
counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings against him. Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed2d 387 (1970); United States v. 
Perez, 769 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985). There can be no question that 
these proceedings were critical. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
226, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed2d 1149 (1967) (right to counsel exists 
where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair 
trial)." 
The Appellee should have been represented by Mr. Fraizer or another lawyer at this hearing, 
(ID 
id the Trial Court should not have failed to follow the previous order entered by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT III 
SHOULD AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT BE FORCED TO GO FORWARD WITH 
COUNSEL WHEN A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATION AND 
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES HAVE OCCURRED A SECOND TIME? 
The Appellee/Petitioner made every effort possible to reconcile with Mr. Fraizer after his re-
ppointment. However, the same problems that Appellee/Petitioner encountered before, began to resurface 
fid start all over again. Mr. Fraizer still refused to read any of the court decisions Appellee/Petitioner offered 
) support his position, refused to return phone calls, refused to meet with Appellee/Petitioner, and refused to 
le a cross-appeal. 
Under the Strickland Test, the Appellee/Petitioner believes he was denied "effective assistance of 
ounsel." When Mr. Fraizer refused to file a cross-appeal, it is clear Mr. Fraizer's inaction fell below an 
bjective standard or reasonable professional judgement. Any other attorney would have filed a cross-appeal 
ased upon some, if not all, of the issues the Appellee/Petitioner outlined in the Statement of Facts (see 
umber six). However, Appellee/Petitioner can be somewhat sympathetic with Mr. Fraizer, to a certain point, 
lr. Fraizer stated: "I've only been paid $150.00." This amount may not cover the printing expense necessary 
)r Mr. Fraizer to file a cross-appeal. On the other hand, an indigent Appellee/Petitioner should not be denied 
ffective assistance of counsel because West Valley City was not willing to fairly compensate Mr. Fraizer. 
When Mr. Fraizer told the Appellee/Petitioner that he was refusing to file a cross-appeal on February 
0, 1997, the Appellee/Petitioner then immediately tried to Motion the Trial Court and the Utah Court of 
appeals for appointment of substitute counsel, which was subsequently denied by both courts. And because 
Ax. Fraizer failed to file a cross-appeal, this has prejudiced the Appellee/Petitioner's defense. If Mr. Fraizer 
/ould have filed a cross-appeal, surely this would prevent the Respondent/Appellant from dismissing the 
Respondent/Appellant's appeal for the sole purpose of re-filing felony charges and subjecting the 
Appellee/Petitioner to additional arrests, time in jail, expense and embarrassment. 
(12) 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE UTAH COMMUNICATION FRAUD STATUTE 76-10-1801 IS AMBIGUOUS AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BAR ANY FURTHER PROSECUTION. 
Under both Utah and U.S. Constitutions, the accused shall have a right to demand the nature of the 
cause of accusation against him in order to prepare a defense. 
The Communications Fraud Statute 76-10-1801 states in part: 
"(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection 
(1) shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things 
obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in 
Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e) " 
"(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of 
executing or concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a 
separate act and offense of communication fraud." 
These two paragraphs seem to completely contradict themselves and make it impossible for a lay 
Defendant and even members of the judiciary to determine with certainty the level of the offense. 
Perhaps, if the Utah Communications Fraud Statue were clear, in regards to the level of the offense, the 
Prosecution may have never filed these charges or would have been able to draft an information that was 
certain. 
In this case, the Prosecutor, in the original information, failed to state the value of any property, 
money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained. In addition, because there was no amount stated, it makes 
it impossible to determine the level of the offense. 
Then, after the Statute of Limitations had expired, the Prosecution attempted to amend the original 
information and alleged four different victims at $300 or more each. If the original information is allowed to be 
amended, do we have four Class A Misdemeanors, or do we have one Third Degree Felony? 
Now to add to the confusion, it is stated: 
"(3) Reliance of the part of any person in not a necessary element of 
the offense described in Subsection (1). " 
Because reliance is not a necessary element of the offense, does that mean it is required first to 
determine the amount the scheme or artifice obtained or sought to be obtained to determine the level of the 
offense? 
(13) 
/hich then could be interpreted to mean that the level of the offense could be determined by something that 
not a present or past material fact, or something that has not yet occurred. If this is not ambiguous and 
infusing, there could be no statute that could ever qualify. 
The Appellee/Petitioner would respectfully request that the Utah Communication Fraud Statute be 
iven special and fair consideration because the Petitioner could be arrested on these very same charges a 
>urth time. The Appellee/Petitioner should not have to endure the hardship to try to determine these issues 
^peatedly. Each time the Appellee/Petitioner is arrested, this causes lost time from his business, Bail Bond 
jes, thousands of dollars in legal fees, and hundreds of hours of legal research. 
These issues are also important to other Utah citizens because if a person was convicted under the 
ftah Communications Fraud Statute, the stigma that society, or a jury, or the Parole Board would attach to 
ne count vs. multiple counts would be a significant factor in the punishment that a convicted defendant 
'ould have to face. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN THEY ALLOWED THE APPELLANT 
TO DISMISS ITS APPEAL WITHOUT THE TERMS OF THE DISMISSAL AGREED TO 
BY THE PARTIES OR FIXED BY THE COURT 
Rule 37(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: 
"Voluntary Dismissal. If the parties to an appeal or other 
proceeding shall sign and file with the clerk and agreement that the 
proceeding be dismissed, specifying the terms as to payment of costs and 
shall pay whatever fees are due, that clerk shall enter an order of dismissal, 
unless otherwise directed by the court. An appeal may be dismissed on 
motion of the appellant upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the 
parties or fixed by the court." (Emphasis added) 
An Appellant normally should be allowed to dismiss its own appeal, if the parties agree to the terms or 
* the terms are fixed by the court. However, in this case, the Appellee/Petitioner did not agree to any terms or 
/as even asked about any terms either by the Prosecutor or the Utah Court of Appeals. Nor did the Utah Court 
f Appeals fix any terms; they just simply dismissed the case without making any specific findings as for their 
uling or terms. Furthermore, the Appellant should not be allowed to dismiss its appeal for the sole purpose to 
How the Prosecution to now refile additional and different charges that will prejudice the Appellant/Petitioner's 
(14) 
Defense. Without triggering, the protection guaranteed by Double Jeopardy or the Statute of Limitations. 
When the Prosecution filed the original information, the Prosecutor had the discretion of what charge to 
file, and how to draft the charging information and the Prosecution also assumed the obligation to put the 
Petitioner on notice of the charges he is called to defend. 
The original information and the Probable Cause statement did not state the victim's names or the 
amounts and did nothing more than partially recite the Utah Communications Fraud Statute 76-18-1801. The 
Petitioner could not prepare a defense based upon this original information, therefore, the petitioner demanded a 
Bill of Particulars which the Prosecution failed to provide. The statute as alleged in this case allows for several 
interpretations of fact as to whether or not the Petitioner attempted to defraud another or whether he attempted 
to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretense, by 
misrepresentations, by false promises or material omissions. Obviously, there are multiple sets of facts and 
alleged wrong doings or circumstances, which could satisfy each and every one of these elements of the offense 
charged. 
The problem is, the Petitioner does not know, even today, and the Prosecution has failed to be able to 
define how the Petitioner allegedly violated this statute. And because the original information is so vague, any 
amendments would now have to be held as additional or different charges which is prohibited under Rule 4 (d) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the two year statute of limitations. 
It seems clear to the Appellee/Petitioner that what the Prosecution is really attempting, is to 
circumvent the court rules and get a second "bite at the apple" at the same time causing the 
Appellee/Petitioner as much grievance and expense as possible. The Federal Court system has addressed the 
issue of charging a Defendant, dismissing and re-charging without triggering the Protection of Double 
Jeopardy as stated in U.S. vs. Derr (726 F2d 617). Other states also have various rules and the Federal Court 
System has Rule 48 to prevent the abuse of a Prosecutors' power. When jeopardy has not attached, and the 
Prosecution has nolle prosequi, re-filing is prohibited if it is capriciously or vexatiously repetitious or causes 
substantial prejudice to the Defendant. Allowing the Prosecution to now re-file felony charges to continue 
this abuse, is unconscionable. The Appellee/Petitioner has personally spent over $10,000.00 in legal fees (and 
(15) 
still counting), has been arrested three different times and jailed for over 30 days, has been subject to bad 
ublicity in the news media, which has substantially affected his business profits and standing in the 
Dmmunity. Because of the amount of time that has passed the Appellee/Petitioner has lost several important 
witnesses that would be vital to the Appellee/Petitioner's defense (Emilio Cortez, Randy Hunter, Dr. Rivera, 
>r. Santos, and Laurie Orr), business records and documents have been lost, misplaced, or wrongfully seized 
nd memories have faded all of which has substantially prejudiced the Appellee/Petitioner's case. 
Appellee/Petitioner has not been able to find a Utah case on the point of charging, dismissing and re-
harging without triggering the Protection of Double Jeopardy or Statute of Limitations. Utah, however, does 
ave Rule 25 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to allow the courts to dismiss a case. 
Rule 25 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in part: 
"(a) It is in the discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of 
justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of 
either party, order an information or indictment dismissed." 
Petitioner believes this case is a prime example of why Rule 25 was enacted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner would respectively request this case be dismissed with prejudice in the furtherance of 
ustice barring any further prosecution of Richard Norris and that this court enter an injuctive order to prevent 
he Respondent or the Salt Lake County District Attorneys Office or the Utah State Attorney Generals Office 
rom any further prosecution or harassment. In the alternative that this case be remanded for the appointment 
)f counsel, and allow the Petitioner an opportunity to file and appeal, so that all of the issues raised herein 
nay be properly briefed and decided between the Respondent and the Petitioner on the merits. 
Submitted this / ' day of July, 1997. 
Richard Norris 
(16) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
from the Utah Court of Appeals, postage pre-paid, this 1 i day of July 1997. 
Mr. Ernie Jones 
Salt Lake Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. C. Danny Frazier 
Attorney for the Appellee-Defendant 
39 West 300 North 
Provo,Utah 84601 
Mr. Keith Stoney 
West Valley City Attorney's Office 
3600 South Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Ms. Marilyn Branch 
Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
/j4^/^^^^J 
Utah Supreme Court 
Room 332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Ms. Jan Graham /ib>r^~//QjJ^^x£/t^j 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Richard Norris 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Vest Valley City 
Respondent, 
Vs. 
'ichard Norris 
Petitioner, 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS. 
CASE NO. 960151CA 
tichard Norris, who is, being by me first duly sworn, deposes and says, based upon his personal 
nowledge: 
1. I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter and I am familiar with the above-
eferenced matter. 
2. I personally prepared the Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Utah Court of Appeals, 
nd to the best of my knowledge and ability, the facts and information presented are true. 
Richard Norris 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this i\ day of July 1997, by Richard Norris, 
vho is personally known to me and who did take an oath. 
Lftiucsl witkckatji 
sfotary Public 
State of Utah 
vly Commission expires on rD 1~ jti^O 
i--r^nM 
Notary Public """ T 
LEANNG MACKAY I 
175 South Mam 
Satt Lake City Utah 84111 I 
My Commission Expires 
July 27 2000 I 
mm aw « t e 0 f U t a h I 
ADDENDUM 
(19) 
Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
City Prosecutor, West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3331 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
NORRIS, RICHARD F. 
678 WILLIAMSBURG 
SANDY, UTAH 
5/15/55 
Defendant. 
WARRANT OF ARREST 
B a i l s 2.000- 00 
Case No. q LH o 0 4 q dA VY\QJ 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHALL OR POLICE OFFICER IN THE STATE: 
Information, upon oath, having been made, by KEITH L. STONEY, that the 
offense(s) of COMM FRAUD, COMM FRAUD, COMM FRAUD, COMM FRAUD has been committed, 
and accusing NORRIS,, RICHARD F. thereof. 
You are therefore commanded to arrest the above-named NORRIS, RICHARD F. 
and bring Defendant before said Court forthwith. 
WITNESS, The Honorable Judge of the above entitled Court. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
WITNESSES STATED TO OFFICERS, THE DEFENDANT ON FOUR DIFFERENT OCCASIONS, 
UNLAWFULLY DEFRAUDED ANOTHER OR OBTAINED FROM ANOTHER, MONEY, PROPERTY, OR 
ANYTHING OF VALUE BY MEANS OF FALSE OR FRAUDULENT PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR MATERIAL OMISSIONS, AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH AN> 
PERSON BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME; THE 
DEFENDANT HAS NO BUSINESS LICENSE TO OPERATE IN WEST VALLEY AND NO CURRENT 
RESIDENCE. THE DEFENDANT'S WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN, THEREFORE, THE CITY REQUESTS 
A WARRANT Of ARREST , > — ^ 
DATEf this . ^ C ^ riav of A d C ^ ^ T ^ - w , 1994. 
'^4 COMPL 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before/he thi 
"7% 
DR, N0RRIS.R2, 94-25376, December 19. 1994 
Deputy *&ierk. . - -j-^.t 
Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3331 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NORRIS, RICHARD F. 
678 WILLIAMSBURG 
SANDY, UTAH 
5/15/55 
Defendant. 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. C[ ^ 0 0 4 3 2 4 WQ.J 
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 12 MAY 1994, 
at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West Valley City, Utah, 
did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 2: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 3: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 4: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
MICHAEL MABRY 
BONNIE GESSEL 
JOAN MATTSON 
KAYLYNN CROSBY 
LISA STAUFFER 
SHERRY FRANCIS 
DOUG FAY 
DETECTIVE PLOTNICK**PLEASE LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ADDITIONAL 
WITNESSES** 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information on the following: 
WITNESSES STATED TO OFFICERS, THE DEFENDANT ON FOUR DIFFERENT 
OCCASIONS, UNLAWFULLY DEFRAUDED ANOTHER OR OBTAINED FROM ANOTHER, 
MONEY, PROPERTY, OR ANYTHING OF VALUE BY MEANS OF FALSE OR 
FRAUDULENT PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES, OR MATERIAL 
OMISSIONS, AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH ANY PERSON 
BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME; 
THE DEFENDANT HAS NO BUSINESS LICENSE TO QEERATE IN WEST VALLEY AND 
NO CURRENT RESIDENCE. THE DEFENDANT' S^ -WIffiREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN, 
THEREFORE, THE CITY REQUESTS A WARRANT^pF ARREST. 
Complain. 
94-Z5376, DR, NORMS. R2 
PTC: , 
December 19, 1994 
Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
Valerie J. O'Brien (6624) 
David L. Clark (6199) 
City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3344 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v . 
NORRIS, RICHARD F . : 
6 7 8 WILLIAMSBURG : 
SANDY, UTAH : 
5 / 1 5 / 5 5 : 
D e f e n d a n t . s 
: A M E N D E D 
: I N F O R M A T I O N 
: C a s e N o . 9 4 1 0 0 4 9 2 9 
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about MARCH, APRIL 
AND/OR MAY OF 1993, at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West 
Valley City, Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 1993 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO MICHAEL MABRY BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
COUNT 2: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 1993 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO JOAN MATTSON BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
COUNT 3: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 1993 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO LISA STAUFFER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
COUNT 4: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 1993 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO SUSAN HUNTER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
MICHAEL MABRY 
BONNIE GESSEL 
JOAN MATTSON 
KAYLYNN CROSBY 
LISA STAUFFER 
SHERRY FRANCIS 
DOUG FAY 
DETECTIVE PLOTNICK**PLEASE LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ADDITIONAL 
WITNESSES** 
SUSAN HUNTER 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information on the following: 
RICHARD NORRIS PLACED A NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT FOR A $1400.00 A 
2 
MONTH SALARIED, WITH BENEFITS, POSITION FOR A DIET COUNSELOR, WHEN, 
IN FACT, THE POSITION HE WAS OFFERING TO THE VICTIM WAS NOT A 
POSITION OF THAT NATURE OR THE NATURE ADVERTISED OR SOLICITED OR 
PROMISED SUCH THAT: 
A. THE POSITION WAS NOT A SALARIED JOB WITH BENEFITS, OR 
B. THE POSITION WAS NOT AS A DIET COUNSELOR, OR 
C. THE POSITION WAS FOR COMMISSIONED SALES OF A DIET PRODUCT, OR 
D. THE CONTRACT MR. NORRIS REQUIRED WAS NOT, WHAT HE SAID IT WAS 
FOR AND AMOUNTED TO A DEBT OF OVER $309 TO EACH VICTIM THAT 
SIGNED IT, OR 
E. THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT A DIET PRODUCT, OR 
F. THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT APPROVED AS A DIET PRODUCT, OR 
G. THE AMOUNT OF PRODUCT SOLD TO THE VICTIM WAS MORE THAN THE 
AMOUNT AGREED UPON BY AND PROMISED BY MR. NORRIS, HENCE THE 
DEBT WAS GREATER THAN INTENDED 
H. MR. NORRIS, AFTER THE SALE, WOULD NOT ACCEPT RETURNS OF THE 
PRODUCT AS PREVIOUSLY INSINUATED, PROMISED OR AGREED, OR 
I. MR. NORRIS KNEW THAT THE PRODUCT WAS ' NOT WHAT HE STATED IT 
WAS, OR 
J. MR. NORRIS USED THIS SCHEME KNOWING PEOPLE COULD NOT LIVE UP 
TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACT, OR 
K. MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE 
VICTIMS, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THE VICTIMS TO MAKE MONEY FOR 
HIS COMPANY, OR 
L. MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY 0F~TiJE OBLIGATION OF THE 
VICTIM, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THEJfVTC^IMS FOR THE FALSE 
VALUES OF THE PRODUCT.. 
Complainant 
94-25376, DR/CP, NORRIS.R2 
PTC: , 
October 2, 1995 
3 
D O C K E T Page 4 
CIRCUIT COURT - WVC THURSDAY FEBRUARY 22, 1996 
11:41 AM 
:-ndant Citation: WVC Case: 941004929 MC 
Agency No.: WVC 
NORRIS, RICHARD F City Misdemeanor 
15/96 TAPE: 13 874 COUNT: 142 SMT 
Deft not present SMT 
ATD: MADDOX, DAVID PRO: STONEY, KEITH SMT 
WEST VALLEY CITY VS RICHARD NORRIS IS BEFORE THE COURT ON A SMT 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE INITIAL INFORMATION AS VOID ON THE BASIS SMT 
IT IS LACKING SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT SMT 
OF PERSONS ALLEGED DEFRAUDED AND THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE SMT 
UTILIZED, PRECLUDING ABILITY TO PREPARE A DEFENSE. THE MOTION SMT 
TO STRIKE WAS FILED SUBSEQUENT TO A DEFENSE REQUEST FOR A BILL SMT 
OF PARTICULARS. THE CITY PROSECUTOR FILED AN AMENDED INFOR- SMT 
MATION. THEREAFTER, THE DEFENSE FILED A MOTION TO QUASH THE SMT 
AMENDED INFORMATION ALLEGING AN INVALID OR VOID INITIAL SMT 
INFORMATION CANNOT BE AMENDED CHARGING CRIMES NOW BARRED BY THE SMT 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. THE COURT RECEIVED SMT 
MEMORANDUMS FROM BOTH PARTIES. IN PROCESS OF REVIEWING THE SMT 
VOLUMINOUS PAPERWORK SUBMITTED BY THE CITY, THE COURT BECAME SMT 
CONCERNED WHETHER IT WAS EXAMINING MATERIAL THAT MAY NEVER SMT 
BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF THE CASE AND MAY SMT 
REQUIRE THE COURT TO RECUSE ITSELF FOR EXAMINING SUCH INVESTI- SMT 
GATIVE MATERIAL. AS IT ALWAYS DOES, IN REVIEWING A CASE, THE SMT 
COURT REVIEWED TO CONFIRM JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. THE SMT 
STATUTE 76-10-1801,U.C.A, 1953, AS AMENDED, UNDER WHICH THE SMT 
OFFENSES ARE CHARGED, INDICATES IN SUBPARAGRAPH TWO (2) SMT 
THEREOF, "THE DETERMINATION OF THE DEGREE OF ANY OFFENSE SMT 
UNDER SUBSECTION (1) SHALL BE MEASURED BY THE TOTAL VALUE SMT 
OF ALL PROPERTY, MONEY, OR THINGS OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE SMT 
OBTAINED BY THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION SMT 
(1) . . ." THE INITIAL INFORMATION IS SILENT AS TO THE NUMBER SMT 
OF VICTIMS AND MEASURE OF VALUE. THE AMENDED INFORAMTION NAMES SMT 
FOUR VICTIMS IN FOUR COUNTS AND MEASURES VALUE OF MORE THAN SMT 
$3 00 IN EACH COUNT. ON JANUARY 4, 1996, THE COURT SENT A SMT 
LETTER TO BOTH PARTIES, MR DAVID MADDOX FOR THE DEFENSE AND SMT 
MR KEITH STONEY FOR THE PROSECUTION, REQUESTING INPUT IF THEY SMT 
DESIRED, ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION. RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED SMT 
FROM THE DEFENSE. NONE WAS RECEIVED FROM THE CITY FOR THE SMT 
COURT'S REVIEW PRIOR TO MAKING ITS DECISION THIS 5TH DAY OF SMT 
FEBRUARY 1996. IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF SMT 
JURISDICTION, THE COURT REVIEWED SOME OF THE INVESTIGATIVE SMT 
MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY THE CITY AND DETERMINED THE $1000 SMT 
JURISDICTIONAL .AMOUNT FOR CIRCUIT COURT JURISDICTION HAD BEEN SMT 
EXCEEDED. FOR EXAMPLE, A LETTER OF DEMAND FROM DEFENDANT SMT 
NORRIS TO A SINGLE VICTIM OF FOUR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION SMT 
DEMANDS $1,600. THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THE CIRCUIT SMT 
COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OF THE FELONIOUS ACTIONS ALLEGED SMT 
IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION. AS A RESULT, THE COURT DOES NOT SMT 
REACH THE ISSUE OF STRIKING THE INITIAL INFORMATION FOR SMT 
VOIDNESS OR THE ISSUE TO QUASH THE AMENDED INFORMATION FOR SMT 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS RAISED BY THE DEFENSE. SMT 
06/96 C/O THE CASE DISMISSED. . SMT 
960250227 Refund of bail. '• '.*•. CHK #".: 011474 2000.00 IHR 
GAYLENE FOWLER," PAYOR" "OF, Q£?H.BAIL, jiECIEVED CASH BAIL REFUND IHR 
FILED 
ut»h Court of Appeals 
MAR 2 6 1997 IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
; l
 aniyn M. Branch 
- -00O00 ' *»K of the Court 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 960151-CA 
West Valley City, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Richard Norris, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme. 
This matter is before the court pursuant to West Valley 
City's motion to dismiss its appeal, to which defendant objects, 
and pursuant to defendant's motion to stay this court's February 
18, 1997 order, to which West Valley City objects. 
West Valley City seeks to dismiss its own appeal of the 
circuit court's order dismissing misdemeanor charges against 
defendant on the ground that the facts supported a felony charge, 
over which the circuit court did not have jurisdiction. 
Subsequently, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office indicated 
its intent to file a felony charge in district court on the same 
facts. Since the circuit and district courts were consolidated 
in July, 1996, the district court now has jurisdiction whether 
the charges are filed as felonies or as misdemeanors. 
Defendant, through counsel, asserts that this appeal should 
not be dismissed because West Valley City will now file felony 
charges against him out of vindictiveness for his filing of a 
motion to dismiss in circuit court. However, even assuming the 
truth of these assumptions, that issue is not before this court 
and may be raised in a different appeal, if and when defendant is 
convicted of felony charges. There is simply no reasoned 
argument that West Valley City should not be allowed to dismiss 
its own appeal from the circuit court's decision. 
Defendant's pro se argument that this court should stay its 
own order directing him to file a response to the motion to 
dismiss by March 3, 1997 is without merit. The trial court does 
not have jurisdiction to consider defendant's latest motion for 
substitute counsel, and defendant's claim that counsel will not 
adequately represent him does not appear to be supported by the 
filings in this court. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of March, 1997, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL was deposited in 
the United States mail to the parties listed below: 
Keith L. Stoney 
Elliot R. Lawrence 
West Valley City Attorney's Office 
3600 South Contsitution Blvd. 
West Valley, City, UT 84119 
C. Danny Frazier 
Attorney for Appellee 
39 West 300 North 
Provo, UT 84601 
courtesy copy to 
Richard Norris 
3392 West 3500 South 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
was deposited in the United States mail to the trial court listed 
below: 
Third Circuit Judge Edward A, Watson 
West Valley City Circuit Court 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
Dated this March 26, 1997 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 960151 
Third Circuit Court, West Valley Dept., Case #941004929 MC 
FILED 
MAY 1 3 1997 
COURT CF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
West Valley City, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Richard Norris, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER 
Case No. 960151-CA 
This matter is before the court pursuant to defendant's 
petition for rehearing and motion to stay remittitur. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing and the 
motion to stay remittitur are denied. 
Dated this p' da^of May, 1997. 
FOR THE COURT: 
